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Knowledge centric management (KCM) has become a key strategy for competitive edge. As an essential of KCM, an 
enterprise ontology represents the knowledge of an organization. Thus, the need for securing enterprise ontologies (EO) 
becomes imperative. Adequate access control is a major component of ontology security. However, access control for EO is 
largely neglected in information systems (IS) literature. This paper presents the first research to fill this gap. I propose five 
requirements for good access-control solutions for EO. The proposed solution offers an architecture framework that meets the 
five requirements. Semantic Web technology is used to build context-aware access controls into EO. My proposal includes a 
novel resolution for policy conflicts. This study provides the first design of fine-grained and dynamically-adjusted access 
authorizations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Global competition propels businesses towards knowledge centric management in which enterprise ontologies are the key 
players. An enterprise ontology is a model that represents the knowledge of an organization. EO distinguishes itself from 
other types of ontologies in the uses. An enterprise ontology typically has predefined users who are granted specific access 
privileges (Fox, Barbuceanu and Gruninger, 1995; Guinn, 2011; Uschold, King, Moralee and Zorgios, 1998). EO is the pivot 
in Business Process Engineering, Strategic Planning, and Management Information Systems (Guinn, 2011).  
Enterprise ontologies are organizational assets. The need for securing EO becomes more imperative than ever before. The 
ontology security needs adequate access control. It ensures that authenticated users perform the authorized activities to an 
enterprise ontology (Chen and Stuckenschmidt, 2012; DISA, 2004; Hu, Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 2006). Unfortunately, access 
control for EO is largely neglected in IS literature. A few prior works attempt to address the issues of the access control. 
However, the proposed approaches are inadequate to address the issues in rich ontology inferences (Chen and 
Stuckenschmidt, 2012; Jain and Farkas, 2006). The access control methods for relational databases are widely available, but 
they are incapable of handling the policy conflicts raised from the ontology inferences (Reddivari, Finin and Joshi, 2007). 
The access control for EO needs emphasis in IS researches. This study aims to fill this gap in IS literature.  
An access-control system performs the user authentication in which the system validates the users and the access 
authorization in which the system declines or permits the activities of the users (DISA, 2004; Hu et al., 2006). This study 
concentrates on the access authorization, the major challenge in the access control. Specifically, I address three research 
questions: 
What are the requirements for good access-control solutions for enterprise ontologies? How do we build context-
aware access-control into enterprise ontologies? What is a good architecture framework for access-control solutions 
that meet the identified requirements? 
To address the research questions, this paper proposes five requirements for good access-control solutions for EO. I also offer 
a novel access-control approach that is fine-grained, context-aware, and dynamically-adjusted. Fine-grained means my 
proposal can control the accesses to any grain of an enterprise ontology according to its particular confidentiality. Context-
aware means the access-control system declines or permits an activity according to not only the users’ authentications but 
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also the contexts in which the users perform the activities to an enterprise ontology (Definition 3 of this paper defines the 
concept of context). Dynamically-adjusted means the system will automatically decline an ongoing activity to the enterprise 
ontology as soon as a change of the context raises a threat to the enterprise ontology. In the subsequent sections, I will 
illustrate the importance of the context awareness and the dynamic adjustment. In summary, my proposal builds adequate 
access control into EO and supports ease-of-maintenance. Additionally, the proposed solution is capable of resolving policy 
conflicts that occur when two access control policies are inconsistent. With the best knowledge I have, this study is the first 
research proposing a comprehensive solution.  
The structure of this paper includes the literature review in the next section. Then, I propose the five requirements for good 
access-control solutions for EO. Next, I build context-aware access control into EO. As followed, I propose the architecture 
framework and provide a use scenario. Lastly, I discuss the future research and conclude this paper.  
RELATED WORKS 
IS researchers have recognized the need for the access control for ontologies (Duan, Kementsietsidis, Le and Wang, 2012; 
Pavlov, 2011). The current approaches mainly adapt two traditional access-control techniques, namely the Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC) and the Label-Based Access Control (LBAC). RBAC aims at reducing the workloads in policy 
maintenances. The technique groups the users sharing the same access privilege into a role. When the role of a user is 
changed, the ontology administrator simply reassigns a new role to the user and does not need modifying the access control 
policies. LBAC supports fine-grained access control. The approach labels the data elements with their respective 
confidentialities. However, few researches address the access control for EO. This section reviews the relevant works.  
Query Rewriting 
Several researches propose the query-rewriting approaches. They use access-control proxies, software modules to rewrite the 
user queries according to pre-defined RBAC policies. Some proposal uses OWL reasoner to address policy conflicts. To 
automate the query-rewriting, ontology developers have to pre-define the rules for it. This is an extremely difficult task. 
Consequently, the use of these approaches is limited. Moreover, query-rewriting tends to suppress useful information because 
the rules enforce the most restrictive policy on the multiple queries of a user. Chen and Stuckenschmidt (2012) implement a 
query-rewriting approach. The work rewrites the SPARQL queries in the XACML (Extensible Access Control Markup 
Language).  
Axiom Filtering 
Axiom-filtering techniques attempt to reduce information suppressing (Baader, Knechtel and Pe˜naloza, 2009; Calvanese, De 
Giacomo, Lenzerini and Rosati 2008; Knechtel, 2008). The techniques label ontology components with pre-defined axioms. 
If an access should be declined, the system answers the user queries with the axioms rather than the requested data. So, the 
axiom-filtering partially resolves information suppressing problem. Still, ontology developers have to pre-define the axioms. 
This is also a difficult task. In general, axiom-filtering techniques do not address policy conflicts. 
Access controls for the RDF stores 
A number of researches propose the access-control solutions for the Resource Description Framework (RDF) stores. One 
work offers context-aware access control but does not resolve policy conflicts (Abel, De Coi, Henze, Koesling, Krause and 
Olmedilla, 2007). Reddivari et al. (2007) implement a RDF-Store Access-Control Policies (RAP) to enforce user-defined 
policies. RAP stores the policies together with the metadata of RDF-triples. A policy engine mediates a user activity and 
determines its access authorization. However, RAP does not resolve policy conflicts. Jain and Farkas (2006) apply LBAC on 
RDF-triples. The solution proposes subsumed RDF-patterns to resolve policy conflicts. However, the approach is not 
context-aware.  
Context-aware Access Controls 
Zhang and Manish (2003) propose the Context Agent to achieve dynamically-adjusted access control for the pervasive 
applications. When a user queries the ontology, a set of roles is assigned to the user. But, only one role is active for the user 
according to the context at a moment. Later, Damiani, Dertino, Catania and Perlasca (2007) use the spatial-contexts to control 
the active role. In a spatial context, a role is either active or inactive. But, the access authorization is not dynamically-
adjusted. Commonly, these two works tend to produce large amounts of specialized roles, and thus, lose the advantage of 
RBAC. More recently, some researches use the level of trust to control the access to an ontology (G¨otz, 2012; Ma, He and 
Gao, 2012). This approach has the difficulty to distinguish between trusted and hostile behaviors.  
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REQUIREMENTS FOR GOOD ACCESS CONTROLS FOR ENTERPRISE ONTOLOGIES 
Few IS researches, if any, have discussed the requirements for good access-control solutions for EO. This paper attempts to 
address them. On the basis of extensive literature review, I adopt the theoretical frameworks of U.S. Department of Defense 
(DISA, 2004) and U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Hu et al., 2006). DISA and NIST define that 
access controls are the mechanisms to determine the allowed activities of the users and to mediate every attempt to access the 
resources in an information system. An access-control system needs performing the user authentication and access 
authorization in order to enforce the access control policies, the organizational requirements for governing the accesses to the 
resources in the information systems. DISA and NIST have standardized their respective frameworks. They provide the 
principles of the access control for information systems. Hereinafter summarizes the principles relevant to the access control 
for EO.    
1. Providing fine-grained access controls: Securing any grain according to its specific confidentiality.    
2. Supporting Separation of Duty (SOD): No user should be given enough access privilege to misuse the system. 
3. Offering means to resolve the policy conflicts. 
4. Achieving suitable efficiency: Performance is critical for a system with large concurrent transactions. 
5. Minimizing the workloads in maintaining access control policies.  
The two frameworks do not highlight context-awareness. However, many prior studies have demonstrated that context-
awareness is an important requirement for the access control for ontologies (Abel et al., 2007; Bertino and Kirkpatrick, 2011; 
Bolchini, Curino, Orsi, Quintarelli, Rossato, Schreiber and Tanca, 2009; Damiani et al., 2007; Zhang and Manish, 2003). 
Extending the principles of DISA and NIST as well as the previous researches, I propose five requirements for good access-
control solutions for EO: 
1. Granularity: Protecting the specific confidentiality of any grain of an enterprise ontology.   
2. Dynamically-context-aware: Automatically declining an ongoing access to the enterprise ontology as soon as a change of 
the context raises a threat to the enterprise ontology.  
3. Separation of Duty (SOD): No user is given enough access privilege to misuse the system.   
4. Conflict-proof: Automatically detecting and resolving policy conflicts. 
5. Ease-of-maintenance: Enabling minimum workload in maintaining the access control policies. 
The requirements of granularity, separation of duty, and ease-of-maintenance are similar to the corresponding principles of 
DISA and NIST. But, I propose a new requirement, dynamically-context-aware. It requires an access-control system grant 
different access authorizations to the same user (role) in different contexts. This is because an enterprise-ontology is often 
more vulnerable in one context than another. For instance, an enterprise-ontology is more vulnerable to network hacks when 
a manager accesses the ontology via a public network than via the company’s intranet. Additionally, dynamically-context-
aware requires an access-control system continue monitoring the context in which a user performs ongoing activities to the 
enterprise ontology. When a contextual change increases the restriction on the user’s activities, the system should 
automatically enforce the higher stringency. To illustrate, let’s consider this scenario: Data analyst Mark is accessing the 
company’s enterprise ontology in his office. While his PC is connecting to the enterprise ontology, Mark leaves his office for 
a few minutes. In the absence of Mark, his PC opens the doors for unauthorized accesses to the enterprise ontology. Such 
negligence often occurs in the uses of information systems (DISA, 2004; Hu et al., 2006). If the access-control system is 
dynamically-context-aware, it can permit the access only when Mark stays within a certain range of his PC. The system 
should automatically logout Mark’s PC from the enterprise ontology when Mark is absent from that range.  
In addition, automatic conflict-proof is especially important for the access control for EO. Police conflicts can occur from the 
ontological inferences when querying an enterprise ontology. Inferences are not an issue when querying relational databases, 
XML data repositories, or other file systems. Finally, performance should not be a pressing issue in the access control for EO 
because there are a small number of concurrent activities in an enterprise-ontology system. It is distinct from a web-service 
system where there are a large number of concurrent activities. A web service often does not predefine its users whereas an 
enterprise ontology predefines its users. Different users are usually allowed to access the enterprise ontology in different time 
periods. In a given period of time, the number of access activities to an enterprise ontology is often small.  
To meet the five requirements, I propose building context-aware access controls into EO.  
BUILDING CONTEXT-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL INTO ENTERPRISE ONTOLOGIES 
This section contains three subsections. The first subsection defines three terms. In the second subsection, I propose the 
access-control properties that build context-aware access control into EO. The third subsection proposes the Resolution Rule 
for Policy Conflicts. 
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Three Terms 
Definition 1 (Secured Objects): A secured object is a portion of an enterprise ontology, which has certain confidentiality 
and requires certain level of access control. A secured object is denoted as SBg.    
A secured object can be any grain of an enterprise-ontology, for example, a class, a property, an instance, a rule, a group of 
classes, etc.  
Definition 2 (Legitimate Roles): A legitimate role is a group of users who share the same access privilege to access an 
enterprise ontology. A legitimate role is denoted as LRh. 
A legitimate role can be a human role or an artificial role. Human roles may include ontology developer, department 
assistant, analyst, etc. Artificial roles are application programs to which certain access privileges are granted.  
For context-awareness, I propose four contextual attributes: location, time, application, device. 
1. Location: The geographical range in which an access to an enterprise-ontology occurs. A location has a status. It is 
either in or out. Status in means the access is permitted at the location. Status out means the access is not allowed at the 
location.   
2. Time: The time when an access to an enterprise-ontology occurs. A time has a status. It is either on or off. Status on 
means the access is permitted at the time. Status off means that the access is not allowed at the time.    
3. Application: The application program used to access the enterprise ontology. An application has a status. It is either alw 
or don. Status alw means the program is allowed to perform the access. Status don means the program is not allowed to 
perform the access.   
4. Device: The electronic device used to access the enterprise ontology. A device has a status. It is asg, cmp, or prv. Status 
asg means the device is assigned to access the enterprise ontology. Status cmp means the device is owned by the 
organization but not specifically assigned to access the enterprise ontology. Status prv means the device is owned by an 
employee of the organization.  
Definition 3 (Contexts): A context is a combination of the statuses of all contextual attributes.  
Example-1: According to the four contextual attributes defined above, here are six examples of contexts:  
C1 (in, on, alw, asg)   C2 (out, on, alw, asg)   C3 (in, on, alw, cmp)    
C4 (out, on, alw, cmp)  C5 (in, on, alw, prv)  C6 (out, on, alw, prv) 




Before defining Access-Control Properties, I shall stress that access control policies should be written in the terms consistent 
with those used by the enterprise ontology. Moreover, an access control policy should be a positive policy that expresses 
‘allow to’ rather than ‘not allow to’.   
Example-2: Here are two examples of access control policies: 
(1) An analyst can retrieve Customer class in work hours and with an allowed application. 
(2) An analyst can retrieve Product class in office and with assigned computer. 
Definition 4 (Access-Control Properties): Let Ok be an operation on EO. Ok can be retrieval, updating, creation, deletion, 
etc. Let Cj be a context. ACPgh = (Ok, Cj) denotes that legitimate role LRh is allowed to perform Ok on secured object SBg in 
Cj. ACPgh is called an access-control property of SBg relative to LRh.  
Intuitively, SBg can have many access-control properties each of which relates SBg to LRh or another legitimate role (Figure 
1). Thus, the access-control properties are build-in access control polices in EO. Moreover, the access-control properties 
meet the requirements of granularity and context-aware. SBg can be any 
grain of an enterprise-ontology. The access-control properties of SBg 
enforce the access control policies with context-awareness (Cj). SBg, Ok, 
and Cj minimize the access privilege of LRh. So, the access-control 
properties meet the requirement of separation of duty.   
 
 
Flory  Building Context-Aware Access Control In Enterprise Ontologies 
Proceedings of the Nineteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Chicago, Illinois, August 15-17, 2013. 5 
Policy Conflict Resolutions 
Policy conflicts often occur when requested objects are involved in subsumption relations. To implement conflict-proof, I 
propose a rule to resolve policy conflicts.    
Definition 5 (Resolution Rule for Policy Conflicts): Let ACPmh be an access-control property of secured object SBm; ACPkh 
be an access-control property of secured object SBk. If SBm subsumes SBk, then both ACPmh and ACPkh can be applied to SBk 
via the ontology inference. If ACPmh is more restrictive than ACPkh, then ACPmh will be applied to SBk. Otherwise, ACPkh 
will be applied to SBk.  
Since the subsumed object should be more sensitive than its parent objects, the proposed rule allows the appropriate access 
control to be enforced. Furthermore, this rule does not suppress the accesses to the secured objects that are not affected by the 
subsumption relation.  
ARCHITECTURE FRAMEWORK 
This section proposes an architecture framework to enforce dynamically-context-aware access control for EO. Figure 2 
depicts the framework including a 4-step workflow.   
1. User Authentication (UA):  The UA interfaces between the users and the enterprise ontology. 
1) Authenticating the user (e.g. IDs and passwords). 
2) Assigning a legitimate role LRh to the user. If the user fails the authentication, the system returns an error message 
to the user and declines the login.   
3) Allowing LRh to submit queries called role queries via a query interface (a 
software module is under design as a part of my ongoing research. The 
module will automatically process the role queries).   
4) Retrieving the current context and passing on the context, legitimate role 
information, and role queries to the Access Evaluator.  
2. Access Evaluator (AE): The AE receives the information from UA and 
retrieves the relevant access-control properties. AE evaluates the role queries 
against the access-control properties. If the role queries pass the evaluation, AE 
passes on them to the Access Authorization (AA). Otherwise, AE declines the 
role queries and sends an error message to UA that passes on the message to 
the user.  
If a policy conflict occurs, AE passes on it to the Conflicts Manager (CM) that 
resolves the conflict according to the Resolution Rule for Policy Conflicts. 
3. Access Authorization (AA): The AA verifies the role queries delivered by AE 
and stamps a “permit” on the role queries that pass the verification. Then, AA 
passes on the stamped queries to the Query Optimization and Processing. If the 
verification indicates a problem, AA will return the role queries to AE, which 
will resolve the problem or decline the role queries. 
4. Query Optimization and Processing:  The ontology query-engine in the 
enterprise ontology optimizes the role queries, executes the optimized queries, and returns the final results to AE. It 
checks the current context to see whether the final results should be rejected or passed on to UA. If UA receives some 
final results from AE, UA will pass on them to the user.  
In the four steps described above, dynamically-adjusted context-aware access control is enforced. UA continues providing 
the current context to AE as long as the user is still accessing the enterprise ontology. AE will immediately reject a role query 
or a query result when a context change disallows it. Also, I consider that query optimization should exist in an enterprise-
ontology system and does not need to be addressed by the access-control solution. The implementations of UA, AE, CM, and 
AA are in the agenda of my ongoing research. 
A USE SCENARIO 
This section provides a use scenario to illustrate the use of the proposed solution. The first phase in using the solution is to 
define the contexts. Here, I use Definition 2 and 3 and skip the first phase. Also, I use the Product Order Ontology (POO) 
given in Figure 3. The second phase is to define the legitimate roles.  
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Defining Legitimate Roles  
1. Artificial role I (LR1): The computers to which certain access privileges are assigned.  
2. Artificial role II (LR2): The applications to which certain access privileges are assigned. 
3. Ontology developer (LR3): This human role designs and implements the POO.  
4. Department assistant (LR4): This human role supports the department managers. 
5. Marketing analyst (LR5): This human role analyzes marketing data and supports marketing decision making.   
6. Financial analyst (LR6): This human role analyzes financial data and supports financial decision making. 
 
Defining Access Control Policies  
The third phase is to define access control policies. Table 1 provides seven examples of access control policies.  
Labels Access Control Policies 
1.  Artificial Role I (LR1) is allowed to retrieve customer and product classes only during time period I. 
2.  Artificial Role II (LR2) is allowed to retrieve customer and product classes only during time period II. 
3.  Ontology developer (LR3) is allowed to perform creation and clear on the POO when the operations are 
performed in acceptable offices, in working hours, and by assigned computers and applications. 
4.  Department assistant (LR4) is allowed to insert related data into the POO when the operations are performed in 
acceptable offices, in working hours, and by assigned computers and applications.  
5.  Marketing analyst (LR5) is allowed to retrieve customer class when the operations are performed in working 
hours and by assigned applications.     
6.  Marketing analyst (LR5) can retrieve customer preference when the operations are performed in working hours, 
in acceptable offices, and by assigned applications. 
7.  Financial analyst (LR6) can retrieve order class when the operations are performed in acceptable offices and by 
company computers and assigned applications. 
 
 
Table 1: Examples of Access Control Policies 
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Building Access-Control Policies in the POO  
The fourth phase is to define the access-control 
properties according to the access control policies. A 
software module is under design as a part of my 
ongoing research. The module will automatically 
generate the access-control properties using the access 
control policies. The module will also automate the 
maintenances of the access-control properties. In this 
paper, I use Protégé to accomplish this task. Figure 4 
provides a portion of the access-control properties. The 
graph also indicates that the proposed solution meets 
the ease-of-maintenance requirement. Adding a new 
access control policy is simply adding new access-
control properties. Changing an access control policy is simply changing the affected access-control properties. In the policy 
maintenances, the unaffected access-control properties are generally intact. After building the access-control properties, an 
automatic diagnosis runs to check for policy conflicts. 
Resolving Policy Conflicts  
The fifth phrase in using the proposed solution is to identify and resolve policy conflicts. In Table 1, both fifth and sixth 
access control policies can be enforced on the secured object preference, which has its own access-control property ACP65 
and also inherits ACP55 from the parent secured object customer. So, a policy conflict occurs from the ontology inference. 
The Access Evaluator will work with the OWL reasoner to detect policy conflict. Then, the Conflicts Manager applies the 
Resolution Rule for Policy Conflicts to resolve the policy conflict. ACP65 will be applied to the preference object since ACP65 
is more restrictive than ACP55.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I have proposed five requirements for good access-control solutions for enterprise ontologies and a 
comprehensive framework that meets the five requirements. The proposed access-control properties build access control 
policies into EO.  
In the near future, I will finish the design and implementation of the prototype access-control system. The prototype will be 
built on Java platform. The OWL2 will be used as ontology language. The SPARQL will be the query engine. The prototype 
will automatically generate and maintain access-control properties. Also, the prototype will automatically detect and resolve 
policy conflicts. Additionally, using the prototype, I will provide a thorough evaluation to the proposed solution. Finally, I 
will extend the innovations to the access control for ontologies in general.    
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